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Abstract
We provide a theoretical description of the Minority Game in terms of crowd
effects. The size of the fluctuations arising in the game is controlled by the
interplay between crowds of like-minded agents and their anti-correlated part-
ners (anticrowds). The theoretical results are in good agreement with the
numerical simulations over the entire parameter range of interest.
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The study of agent-based models of complex adaptive systems is attracting much at-
tention [1]. Among the many possible interdisciplinary applications is the growing field of
econophysics [2]: each agent knows the past ups and downs in the index of a financial market
and must decide how to trade based on this global information. The Minority Game (MG)
introduced by Challet and Zhang [3,4], offers arguably the simplest paradigm for such a
complex, adaptive system. The MG comprises an odd number N of agents, each equipped
with s strategies and a memory size m, who repeatedly compete to be in the minority [3–10].
The most striking feature arising from numerical simulations is the non-monotonic variation
in the size of the fluctuations (i.e. standard deviation) produced by the MG as m is varied
[4]. Challet et al provided a sophisticated formal connection between the MG and spin glass
systems [5] which offers many fascinating quantitative insights into the MG’s dynamics.
Given the complexity of this dynamics, it is understandable that no general theory has yet
been proposed which yields quantitative agreement with the numerical results of Ref. [4]
over the full range of m, s and N values.
In this paper, we show that a theoretical model can be constructed in a surprisingly
simple way by incorporating the ‘crowd’ effects (i.e. strong inter-agent correlations) which
arise within the interacting, many-agent population. The results yield good agreement with
the numerical results [4] over the entire range of m, s and N . The non-monotonic behaviour
of the standard deviation [3,4] is shown to arise from a fascinating interplay between a crowd
and its anti-correlated partner (‘anticrowd’).
The MG [3] comprises an odd number of agents N who choose repeatedly between option
0 (e.g. buy) and option 1 (e.g. sell). The winners are those in the minority group, e.g. sellers
win if there is an excess of buyers. The outcome at each timestep represents the winning
decision, 0 or 1. A common bit-string of the m most recent outcomes is made available
to the agents at each timestep. The agents randomly pick s strategies at the beginning of
the game, with repetitions allowed. After each turn, the agent assigns one (virtual) point
to each of his strategies which would have predicted the correct outcome. At each turn of
the game, the agent uses the most successful strategy, i.e. the one with the most virtual
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points, among his s strategies. The strategy-space Vm forms a 2m-dimensional hypercube
with strategies at the 22
m
vertices. Fortunately, the MG’s standard deviation is essentially
unchanged if a ‘reduced’ strategy space Um is used instead of Vm [3]: the Um only contains
2m+1 strategies or equivalently 2m strategy pairs {G}. The two strategies within a given
pair G are anticorrelated, i.e. they differ by the maximum possible Hamming distance
dH = 2
m [3]. Strategies between any two pairs G and G ′ are uncorrelated, i.e. they differ by
dH = 2
m−1. The results presented in this paper employ the reduced strategy space.
If nR agents use the same strategy R, then they will act as a ‘crowd’, i.e. they will make
the same decision. If nR¯ agents simultaneously use the anticorrelated strategy R¯, they will
make the opposite decision and will hence act as an ‘anticrowd’ (G ≡ (R, R¯)). If nR ≈ nR¯
for all G, then the actions of the crowds and anticrowds cancel and the standard deviation
σ of the number of agents choosing a given option (the so-called ‘attendance’ time-series
A(t)) will be small. In contrast if nR ≫ nR¯ for all G, then σ will be large. Since there is no
correlation between G and G ′, each group G comprising a crowd-anticrowd pair (nR, nR¯) will
contribute to the attendance A(t) via a separate random walk in time of step-size |nR−nR¯|.
The variances of these walks can then be summed to obtain the standard deviation of A(t).
Hence we describe the MG standard deviation using the following theoretical expression:
σ =
[ 2m∑
G=1
σ2G
] 1
2
=
[ ∑
G≡(R,R¯)
1
4
|nR − nR¯|2
] 1
2
(1)
where both time-averaging, for a given configuration of initial strategies, and configuration-
averaging have been carried out. We now demonstrate that this crowd-anticrowd cancella-
tion underlies the numerical results for σ vs. m [4]. We run the numerical simulation of
the MG and wait until transients in A(t) have disappeared. At timestep t0, we read out the
number of players playing each strategy R, where R = 1, 2, . . . 2m+1. For each strategy pair
G = (R, R¯), we calculate nR−nR¯ at time t0 and hence obtain σ. We then average this σ over
1000 timesteps to simulate the time-averaging. We have checked that our results are insensi-
tive to the precise time-averaging procedure. Finally, we average over 16 runs to simulate the
configuration-averaging. Figure 1 compares the resulting time and configuration-averaged σ
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with that obtained from the numerical MG simulation. The agreement is very good for all
m, s and N (not shown). We conclude that the crowd-anticrowd cancellation can indeed
quantitatively explain the numerical results of Ref. [4].
We need expressions for the number of agents using each strategy, i.e. {nR}. Since
the labels R are arbitrary in Eq. (1), the ordering of strategies {nR} has no particular
significance. At any particular time t0, these 2
m+1 strategies can be ranked according to
their virtual points by a sort-operation Θ acting on the list {nR}. Hence {nR} Θ7→ {nρ}
where ρ is the virtual-point rank label with ρ = 1 being the highest scoring strategy and
{nρ} ≡ nρ=1, nρ=2, . . . nρ=2m+1 . Another useful method of ordering is achieved by ranking
strategies {nR} at time t0 according to their popularity. In particular, strategy r = 1 is
defined as the strategy which is being used by the largest number of agents, strategy r = 2
is being used by the second largest number of agents, etc. We denote the popularity ranking
by {nr} where {nr} ≡ nr=1, nr=2, . . . nr=2m+1 . Note that {nr} can be obtained from {nR}
and hence {nρ} by sort operations, i.e. {nR} Ψ7→ {nr} and hence {nρ} Γ7→ {nr}. Each agent
plays the available strategy having highest virtual points; this allows an analytic expression
to be obtained for the probability that an agent plays a given strategy for general s, which
in turn yields
nr = N
([
1− (r − 1)
2m+1
]s
−
[
1− r
2m+1
]s)
(2)
where
∑2m+1
r=1 nr = N as required. Since agents are discrete objects, the simulation tends
to produce discrete steps in the curves of nr as a function of r. This effect becomes more
pronounced as m increases since the total number of strategies 2m+1 then exceeds the pop-
ulation size N . We therefore convert the theoretical nr values of Eq. (2) to an integer. For
large m such that 2m+1 ≫ N , the resulting theoretical values are typically nr ∼ 1 for small
r and nr = 0 for r > N . Figure 2 compares the theoretical values of nr calculated using
Eq. (2) with s = 2 and N = 101, to numerical values taken from the MG simulation. The
agreement is good.
For the virtual-point ordered list {nρ}, the strategy ρ′ = 2m+1 + 1− ρ is always anticor-
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related to the strategy ρ, i.e. ρ′ ≡ ρ¯. Hence knowledge of the sort operation Γ completely
determines where each strategy’s anticorrelated partner is located in the popularity-ordered
list {nr}. Since we are here only interested in time-averaged and run-averaged σ, we only
need to consider the probability distribution of locations of r¯ in the popularity-ordered list
{nr}. We therefore replace the sort operation Γ by a probability function P (r′ = r¯) which
gives the probability that any strategy r′ is the anti-correlated partner of strategy r in the
list {nr}. Hence Eq. (1) becomes
σ =
[
1
2
2m+1∑
r=1
2m+1∑
r′=1
1
4
|nr − nr′ |2P (r′ = r¯)
] 1
2
(3)
where the factor 1
2
discounts double-counting. There are two limiting cases. When the
virtual-point ordered list {nρ} and the popularity-ordered list {nr} are identical, then P (r′ =
r¯) will be a δ-function at r′ = 2m+1+1− r and hence Eq. (3) has the same form as Eq. (1).
In the opposite case where the two ordered lists are uncorrelated, P (r′ = r¯) should be a flat
distribution. In each case, Eqs. (2) and (3) can be combined to obtain closed-form analytic
solutions for arbitrary s and N .
Figure 3 shows P (r′ = r¯) for r = 1 as a function of r′, taken from the numerical MG
simulation at m = 2, 5 and 10. For small m (m = 2) the anticorrelated strategy to the most
popular strategy (i.e. r = 1) is at r′ = 2m+1, i.e. it is the least popular strategy. Hence
P (r′ = r¯) resembles the δ-function limiting case mentioned above. From Fig. 2 we know that
very few agents will therefore pick this anticorrelated strategy. Hence the crowd-anticrowd
cancellation will be small and σ will be large, as can be seen in Fig. 1. As m increases
(m = 5) a remarkable effect occurs: the peak in P (r′ = r¯) moves up toward r = 1. Hence
both r = 1 and its anticorrelated partner r¯ are now very popular. Whereas for m = 2 it
seemed like there was an effective ‘repulsion’ between r and r¯, for m = 5 this now seems
more like an attraction. Amusingly, the shape of P (r′ = r¯) for m = 5 is reminiscent of the
screening effect of a negative charge cloud around a positive charge placed at r = 1, or even
a bound electron-hole pair (i.e. exciton) with the crowd (anticrowd) playing the role of the
positive (negative) charge. For large m (m = 10), the ability of the anticrowd to ‘screen’
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the crowd has decreased yielding a rather flat distribution as shown. The consequence of
this strong crowd-anticrowd correlation which appears as m increases, is that the crowd and
anticrowd become comparable in size. Hence σ is small for m ∼ 5 − 6, in agreement with
Fig. 1. Note that the MG cannot fully ‘optimize’ itself by building equal-sized crowds and
anticrowds. In modified models of MG [11] where this in-built frustration in the strategy
space is allowed to relax, equal-sized crowds and anti-crowds do naturally emerge.
We now consider analytic expressions for σ for general s using Eqs. (2) and (3). For
small m, the virtual-point ordered list {nρ} and the popularity-ordered list {nr} will be very
similar, hence P (r′ = r¯) ∼ δr′,2m+1+1−r. The discreteness of the agents will be unimportant
since nr ≫ 1, hence nr can be treated as continuous. Equations (2) and (3) yield
σlow m =
N
2
[ 2m∑
r=1
[(
1− r − 1
2m+1
)s
−
(
1− r
2m+1
)s
−
(
r
2m+1
)s
+
(
r
2m+1
)s(
1− 1
r
)s]2 ] 1
2
. (4)
For s = 2 this becomes
σlow m =
N√
3 2
m
2
+1
[
1− 2−2(m+1)
] 1
2
. (5)
Figure 4 shows these analytic curves for s = 2 and s = 4 (solid lines monotonically decreas-
ing). As might be expected using the extreme δ-function form for P (r′ = r¯), these curves are
slightly higher than the numerical results in Fig. 1 for small m. Now consider the opposite
extreme of uncorrelated r′ and r¯, i.e. the flat distribution P (r′ = r¯) ∼ 2−(m+1). For s = 2
this gives
σlow m =
N√
3 2
(m+3)
2
[
1− 2−2(m+1)
] 1
2
. (6)
Equation (6) typically produces lower estimates for each s value (dashed lines). Values of
σ obtained from separate numerical runs tend to be scattered in the region of these curves.
For larger m (m > 6) we cannot ignore the discreteness of the agents (Fig. 2). In this
regime, nr ∼ 1 for r < N while nr = 0 for r > N . Using the integer form of Eq. (2) for high
m, and the flat distribution for P (r′ = r¯), yields
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σhigh m =
√
N
2
[
1− N
2m+1
] 1
2
. (7)
This expression approaches the coin-toss limit from below as m → ∞, as shown in Fig.
4 (solid line monotonically increasing). Within the approximation used here, this curve is
insensitive to s. Note that the numerical MG results are also consistent with this finding
of weak s-dependence for large m. Hence Fig. 4 gives a clear picture of what happens to
σ as s and m increase: considering the monotonically decreasing curve for low m, and the
monotonically increasing curve for high m, we see that (a) there should be a minimum in σ
for s = 2, (b) this minimum should move to higher m as s increases and (c) the minimum
should become shallower as s increases. Each of these statements agrees with numerical
simulation results (c.f. Fig. 1). In addition, the curve σhigh m → 0 at N = 2m+1, i.e. for
m ∼ 5− 6.
We now compare the theoretical crowd-anticrowd calculation (Eq. (3)) with the numer-
ical simulation. The most interesting case is s = 2. Figure 5 shows the spread of numerical
values for different runs (open circles) compared to theory (solid circles). The agreement is
good. The appropriate analytic expressions for the probability function P (r′ = r¯) in Eq. (3)
involve multiple sums and are complicated: we therefore obtained the results for each m in
Fig. 5 by generating the corresponding P (r′ = r¯) forms to those in Fig. 3. The theoretical
points tend to lie in between the limiting curves of Fig. 4 except at the minimum where
the remarkable form for P (r′ = r¯) (recall Fig. 3) pulls the theoretical value slightly below
the cruder limiting curves of Fig. 4. Elsewhere we will discuss simpler closed-form expres-
sions for P (r′ = r¯), together with an analysis of the time-series A(t) and history bit-string
statistics within the crowd-anticrowd model [12].
In summary we presented an analytic analysis of crowding effects in MG which offers a
novel explanation of the main finding of Ref. [4]. Future work will explore possible connec-
tions to the spin-glass formalism of Challet et al [5].
We thank T.S. Lo, J.P. Garrahan, D. Sherrington and D. Challet for discussions.
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FIGURES
FIG. 1. Standard deviation σ for the Minority Game as a function of memory-size m for
s = 2, 3, 4 strategies per agent and N = 101 agents. Solid curve: numerical simulation. Dashed
curve: crowd-anticrowd theory using Eq. (1). Random (coin-toss) limit σ =
√
N/2 = 5.0 is
indicated.
FIG. 2. Histograms of the number of agents using strategy r for r = 1 (most popular) to
r = 2m+1 (least popular). Results are shown for m = 2 (left scale) and m = 7 (right scale). Solid
lines: numerical simulation. Dashed lines: theory from Eq. (2).
FIG. 3. Probability function P (r′ = r¯) giving the probability that the strategy ranked r′ on
the popularity-ordered list, is anti-correlated with the strategy ranked r. Results are shown for
r = 1 (i.e. most popular strategy) as a function of r′ for m = 2 (dotted-dashed), m = 5 (dotted)
and m = 10 (solid). s = 2 and N = 101. Note that
∑
r′ P (r
′ = r¯) = 1.
FIG. 4. Theoretical curves for σ using Eqs. (4)-(7). Monotonically decreasing curves for s = 2, 4
at low m (m < 6): solid lines correspond to δ-function P (r′ = r¯) distribution neglecting agent dis-
creteness, dashed lines correspond to flat distribution neglecting agent discreteness. Monotonically
increasing solid line for large m (m > 6) is independent of s: it corresponds to a flat distribution
and accounts for agent discreteness.
FIG. 5. Theoretical crowd-anticrowd calculation (solid circles) vs. numerical simulations (open
circles) for s = 2, N = 101. 16 numerical runs are shown for each m.
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